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Medieval Law in the Age of Space: Some
"Rules of Property" in Arkansas
Robert R. Wright*
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
Oliver Wendell Holmes"

One of the projects of the Arkansas Bar Association of the
past few years is directed toward promoting the improvement
of county courthouses throughout the State. Although some of
our courthouses are fairly modern structures, the vast majority
are relics of the late 19th century. They stand in Victorian splendor, cold and drafty in the wintertime, hot and sometimes odiferous in the summer, their battlements overlooking the twentieth
century world of commerce like Sir Walter Scott catching a
glimpse of Cape Kennedy. Their architecture is from a period
when local affairs revolved around them and around the county
governmental system generally, and their appearance all too often reflects that time and events have eroded the foundation of
their importance as centers of local government. Thus are lawyers and judges all too often left to adjudicate the affairs of
men in an atmosphere that recalls Prince Albert coats and
black bow ties, and sometimes reflects itself more tangibly in
falling plaster, rickety furniture, and pink , purple and creamcolored American flags.
Small wonder that in an atmosphere such as this, the law
we deal with is often "old law," which is to say that it has its
genesis in an age having only a limited relationship at best to
transcontinental jet flights, communication satellites, space exploration, or instant communication with all parts of the world.
For although our courthouses may in many counties be old and
in need of repair, they are centuries more modern than some of
the legal doctrines practiced in them.
This is not to say that because some rules are old, they are
rendered obsolete by virtue of that fact. Many old rules are
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. (Author's Note:
This article is adapted from a talk delivered to the Annual Fall Legal
Institute at the University of Arkansas in October, 1966. It has been
rewritten to some extent, but retains some of the flavor of a talk as
opposed to a law review article. I wish to express appreciation to W.
Dent Gitchel, one of the Editors of the Law Review, for his assistance
with the footnotes.)
** The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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often the best. But to the extent that time has deprived them
of their meaning in a modern transactional setting, so that they
become an impediment or a snare for the unsuspecting, they
should be reconsidered in the light of existing conditions and the
utility of our own time and place. Insofar as those "rules of law"
are concerned which pertain to commercial and business practices, it would seem not only rational but mandatory, in order
that the law function expeditiously and fulfill the expectations
of society, that rules change as the practices themselves change.
Thus do they become relevant to the times in which we live.
Real estate is simply another asset which forms a part of the
modern commercial scene, and the sale of land should be viewed
with no substantially greater mystique than the sale of other
assets. The same principle therefore applies to land as to other
objects of value.
Indeed, we should have no less confidence in our ability
to create relevant law to serve our needs than did the medieval
lawyer who, by virtue of simply being able to read and write,
was thereby worthy to be considered an educated man. Certainly we should be in a better position to develop rules of law
for the twentieth century than a man who lived five or six centuries earlier and who, in his wildest fantasies, could never have
imagined even a fraction of the technological advances and transactional complexities of our life of today.
Yet in the field of real property, many of the "rules" which
determine our rights are the same rules which were devised to
meet the exigencies of the feudal period and the relationship
between the lord of the manor and his freeholders or villeins,
and these have no more relevance to real estate transactions
today than a covered wagon does to a Boeing 707.
As one Texas supreme court justice stated, these rules are
often relics "not of the horse and buggy days, but of the preceding stone cart and oxen days."'
In this context, brief consideration will be given to some
of these immutable "rules of law" which Arkansas lives by in
the field of real property, although it should be kept in mind that
this article is an overview and is not intended to provide an in
depth examination of the subjects touched upon.

1. Sybert v. Sybert, 152 Tex. 106, 254 S.W.2d 999, 1001 (1953).
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THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE

Here is a gem, a real jewel, cut by medieval methods for
medieval masters. It had its apparent beginning in the enlightened year of 1324, when a few hundred people congregated together constituted urban living, when superstition was rife,
when serfs lived in huts with thatch roofs and mud floors and
when the lords and ladies of the castle were not beset with instant television commercials on the glories of underarm deodorant, filter-tip cigarettes, or the problems of washday blues, greasy
hair pomade, stubborn bowels or upset stomach. If a dove flew
into their kitchen, it was a real one; and these were hardly the
swingers of the Pepsi generation.
The Rule in Shelley's Case actually was enunciated centuries
earlier in Abel's Case,2 and it did not receive its modern name
until the late 15th century in the case of Wolfe v. Shelley.
Nonetheless, it has endured ever since then, and we have in
turn endured it although its sanctity and survival in most jurisdictions has in recent years disappeared. Boiled down, the rule
simply provides that if an instrument limits a freehold estate to
A with a remainder to A's heirs, then A takes a fee simple absolute. The mechanics of it are that the remainder in the heirs
is converted to a remainder in A. Under the principles of merger,
4
A's life estate and his remainder come together to form the fee.
Traditionally, the rule had application whether the grant was to
A for life, remainder to his heirs, or to A for life, remainder to
A's bodily heirs." In the latter situation, of course, A took a fee
tail. However, as a result of an Arkansas statute, the Rule in
Shelley's Case theoretically no longer applies in the fee tail situation in Arkansas (although it still does in part), and although
2. Y.B. 18 Edw. II 577, 7 M. & G. 941, note c (1324).

See 1 AMER-

ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.40 (Casner ed. 1952). Abel's Case is set out
in a footnote to Harrison v. Harrison, 135 Eng. Rep. 381, 383 (1844), in
which the court states that the "rule itself did not originate with that
[Shelley's] case; it is as old as the Y.B. 18 E. 2, fo. 577, and depends
upon the feudal law, which always preferred to give an estate by descent rather than by purchase." 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 378, at 284
n.7 (1967), states that the "earliest case arguably concerned with" the
rule was Y.B. 2 & 3 Ed. II, 47 (1309), and that Abel's Case only "contains language believed to recognize" the rule. The Provost of Beverley's Case, Y.B. 40 Ed. III, 9 (1366) applied the rule and is cited by Lord
Coke in support of it. 1 Co. Rep. 104a.
3. 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581).
See BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 280
(1943).
4.

5.
6.

See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.41 (Casner ed. 1952).

Id.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1947).
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it has full application in the fee simple situation. While the
majority of American jurisdictions have abolished it altogether 7
Arkansas follows it as a rule of law. 8
It would seem only reasonable to ask why this apparition
should be a rule of law when its only utility is as a trap for the
unwary. The grantor may very well want his grantee to have
only a life estate and the grantee's natural heirs to have the land
absolutely when the grantee dies. He may want to preserve the
land within the family, at least for a time, without creating the
fee tail situation. The grantee's "heirs" may be brothers and
sisters of the grantee rather than children. Why should the
grantor have to resort to some trust device, elaborate or otherwise, or some similar tool when, absent Shelley, his intent could
be accomplished quite easily? It hardly makes a sound argument to say that the Rule makes land more freely alienable.
For one thing, it was obviously the intent of the grantor (which
should be at least as important as the law's aversion to restraints
on alienation) that the land be tied up during the grantee's life
in order that he would not be able to prevent his heirs from
having it when he died. Since in this day and age the majority
of deeds are prepared by lawyers, the grantor's lawyer would
surely apprise him of the effect of such a conveyance (sans
Shelley), and after such warning if the grantor wished to so encumber his conveyance, he should be permitted to do so. It
is his land and within the confines of the public interest, he
should be free to act as he chooses in connection with it.
If Arkansas abolished this rule, it would hardly be a pacemaker among Anglo-American jurisdictions. England abolished
Shelley's Rule in 1925. 9 The Rule has been abrogated by statute
in the District of Columbia1 ° and in thirty-eight states 1 and
7. 3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 380 (1967).
8. Bishop v. Williams, 221 Ark. 617, 255 S.W.2d 171 (1953), noted

in 7 ARK. L. REV. 411 (1953); First Nat'l Bank v. Graham, 195 Ark. 586,
113 S.W.2d 497 (1938).

9. Property Act of 1925, 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 131. See 3 POWELL,
supra note 2, § 378, at 281 (1967).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-203 (1961).
11. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 141 (1940); ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 59-5-2, 59-5-3 (1949); Aiuz. REV. STAT. § 33-231 (1956); CAL. Civ.
CODE

§ 779 (Deering 1949);

CONN. GEN. STAT. §

47-4 (1958);

FLA. STAT.

ANN. § 689.17 (Supp. 1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-504 (1955); IDAHO CODE
§ 55-206 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 30, §§ 186 (1955); IOWA CODE § 557.20,
557.21 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-502, 58-503 (Sup. 1939); KY.
REv. STAT. § 381.090 (1946); ME. REV. STAT. C. 168, § 12 (1954); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 93, § 366 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 184, § 5 (1939); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.28 (1957); MINN.STAT. § 500.14 (Henderson 1949); Mss.
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has been found not to be in force by courts in a number of other
states. 12 Only four states are left in which the Rule definitely
exists, 18 with Arkansas, of course, being among them. Leading
writers in the field of property find little to weep about upon the
demise of the Rule. Powell states: "Courts act wisely when they
interpret these statutes, in accordance with their obvious
policy, as intended to extirpate, root and branch, a too-longsurvived anachronism.' 4 Simes and Smith, in their landmark
work on future interests, declare: "Difficult as it is to define the
precise scope of the rule in Shelley's Case, still greater difficulties are likely to be experienced in finding any rational basis
for it."'u And so it goes, until it would simply be gilding the
lily to quote from the legion of writers, whether they be law
professors, judges or practicing attorneys, who from time to
time have vented their passion against this aberration of an
earlier era.'8
Before leaving Shelley, some mention should be made of
its origin, obscure though it may be. Some have suggested that
the rule was simply a natural outgrowth of the condition
prevailing in the feudal period in which land was normally held
for life only, and their heirs obtained their estate through the
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 835 (1942); Mo. ANN.
§ 67-520 (Choate

STAT.

§ 474.470 (1956);

MONT. REV.

Wertz 1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-112
(1950); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551.8 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-14
(1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-17 (1953); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 54
-

(C.L.S. 1963); N.D. REV. CODE § 47-0420 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2107.49 (Baldwin 1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 41 (1949); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 114.220 (1957-1958); PA. LAWS, No. 39, § 17, p. 109 (1947); RI.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-4-2 (1956); S.C. CODE § 57-2 (1952); S.D. CODE §
51.0420 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-103 (1955); TEx. CIV. STAT. art.
1291(a) (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-14 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3534
(1943); Wis. STAT. § 230.28 (1947). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 4.51 (Osner ed. 1952).
12. Thurston v. Allen, 8 Hawaii 392 (1891); Kennedy v. Rutter,
110 Vt. 332, 6 A.2d 17 (1939).
13. Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, and North Carolina. See Shields
v. Shields, 179 Ark. 167, 14 S.W.2d 545 (1929); Springhitt v. Monaghan,
50 A.2d 612 (Del. 1946); DeLawter v. DeLawter, 90 Ind. App. 571, 169
N.E. 472 (1930); Rawls v. Roebuck, 228 N.C. 537, 46 S.E.2d 323 (1948).
14. 3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 380, at 305 (1967).
15. 3 SrMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1543, at 427 (2d ed. 1956).
16. See e.g., Mochary, Reflections of An Arkansas Property Teacher

Upon Reading Professor Leach's Property Law Indicted, 21 ARK. L.
REV. 567, 572 (1968); Young, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Illinois: A
New Analysis and Suggestion for Repeal, 45 ILL. L. REV. 173 (1950);
Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case in North Carolina, 20 N.C.L. REV. 49
(1941); O'Connell, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Oregon, 20 ORE. L. REy.
103 (1941); Comment, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Washington, 15
WASH. L. REV. 99 (1940).
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overlord rather than by descent.'7 When inheritable estates
came into being, the conveyance was to "A and his heirs," with
the words, "and his heirs," being necessary as words of limitation to accomplish the objective. So, if Blackacre were conveyed
to A for life, with the remainder to A's heirs, it was a simple
extension (perhaps viewed as a parallel situation) to say that,
again, the words, "remainder to A's heirs" were words of limitation and not of purchase. It is perhaps a more satisfactory
explanation to observe that historically the rule prevented the
overlord from being deprived of the benefits of feudal tenure.
Simes and Smith state:
For example, if A owned land in fee simple and died leaving an
heir who took it by descent from him, certain feudal obligations
were owed to the overlord by their heir. If, however, the heir
took by purchase, these valuable incidents of feudal tenure did
not accrue to the lord. Thus, if A, the owner in fee, should
desire to deprive his lord of the benefit of various feudal incidents, such as wardships and marriage, on his death, he might
convey to X, and then X would convey back to A for life, remainder to A's heirs. Had it not been for the rule in Shelley's
Case, A's purpose would have been accomplished. But such a
device as A attempted would have so depleted the income of the
landed nobility that the courts imposed the rule in Shelley's
Case to prevent it.18
While there are other possibilities, such as the absence of
contingent remainders at the time the rule evolved, 9 and the
possibility that the situation was affected by the rule of primogeniture whereby a person did not leave "heirs" but only "an
heir" at his death,2 0 the fact remains with regard to this day
and age that all of these reasons have long since gone to their
graves. The incidents of feudal tenure, such as wardship, marriage and the like, have never had relevance on American soil;
we have had inheritable estates and contingent remainders for
centuries; and the law of primogeniture is largely (and should
be in its entirety) a peculiarity of bygone days. The only rational basis for the rule today would seem to be that it increases the alienability of land. But experts in the field are
quick to point out that the "operation of the rule is so arbitrary
that even the freer alienability which is gained hardly outweighs
' 21
its disadvantages."
As the North Carolina court said as far back as 1897, Shel17.
18.

3 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 15, §

Id. at 428.

1543, at 427.

19. WILLIAMS, REAL ProPERTY 386, n.e. (23d ed. 1920);
SMITH, supra note 15, § 1543, at 429.
20. 3 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 15, § 1543, at 429.

21. Id. at 430.

3 SimEs &
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ley's Rule is "the Don Quixote of the law, which, like the last
knight errant of chivalry, has long survived every cause that
gave it birth, and now wanders aimlessly through
the reports,
''22
still vigorous but equally useless and dangerous.
II. FEE TAIL
It may be argued that Arkansas has abolished both the fee
23
tail and the application of Shelley's Case to fee tail situations.
Technically we have, to some extent. We have limited it to the
point, by a substitution of estates, that in effect we presently
have what might be called a bob-tailed fee tail.2 4 As a matter
of fact, Professor Powell indicates that there is no other quite
25
like it in the English-speaking world.
It should also be noted in advance of even this limited discussion that a line of fee tail cases in Arkansas may be found
to support any one of several inconsistent propositions, and
since none of these cases have been reversed, the success or
failure of litigation on the subject may depend on which labyrinth the Court wishes to explore to find the desired cubbyhole
in which to fit a particular case. The state supreme court's
dilemma is that there are a certain number of these Arkansas
fee tail cases which are simply irreconciliable, although the
court has not recognized that fact in haec verba. Professor Samuel Fetters has explored the fee tail area in detail in an article
22. Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251, 28 S.E. 20, 22 (1897).
23. In Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303, 310, 24 S.W. 490, 492 (1893),
the Arkansas court made two erroneous assumptions in one sentence:

"The rule [in Shelley's Case] has never been changed in this State,
except in one respect-estates tail have been abolished." It added: "To
this extent it [Shelley] has been repealed." The errors: (1) The statute did not abolish estates tail, but only provided for substituted estates;

and (2) as the result of some court decisions, hereinafter discussed, the
principle of Shelley's Case has been applied in altered form and slightly
altered result in a limited number of fee tail situations in Arkansas. It
is not applied by name, but in principle.

See notes 32, 34, and 35, infra.

As did Shelley's Case, when applied to fee tail conveyances, the result
in these cases was to create an early vesting in fee (though in fee simple
rather than fee tail).
24. It is "bob-tailed" because we still allow the bodily heirs to take
as such-they just take in fee simple, following a life estate, under our
substituted estates type of statute. Our statute did not abolish fee tail
as such; it replaced the fee tail created by the grantor with other estates
(life estate followed by a remainder vesting in fee simple in the entailed
heirs).

The remainder still passed as by fee tail to those who would

and could take such an estate; it then vested in fee simple.

See the

comments in Fetters, The Entailed Estate: Ferment for Reform in
Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REv. 275, 281 (1966).

25. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 198[2], at 84.2 - 84.3.
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in the Arkansas Law Review, 26 which develops this subject extensively and graphically illustrates, in many more facets than
those mentioned here, the prevailing contradictions and confusion.
Our fee tail statute provides that in cases where under the
common law any person would become seized of a fee tail estate, such person shall instead have a life estate, "and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom
the estate tail would first pass according to the course of the
common law."2 7 As mentioned earlier, this statute seemingly
28
does away with Shelley's apparition in the fee tail situation.
Bothered by the statute, the legislature in 1957 provided for dissolution of such an estate by the grantor, the life tenant or
tenants and "all of the other persons then living who might be
remaindermen 29 executing a conveyance of the fee, which would
vest a fee simple estate in the grantee. This more recent statute
apparently provided a way to do away with what had been created, but it obviously was a limited form of relief and left the
situation essentially as it had been from a practical standpoint.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the basic statute
is that if A conveys to B for life, remainder to the heirs of B's
body, then B has a life estate and his bodily heirs will take in fee
simple absolute. That is what it says, and that is what the
early Arkansas cases said that it said. 30 But what if A goes a
step further and conveys to B for life, remainder to C for life,
remainder to the heirs of C's body? This was essentially the
problem in Myar v. Snow, 31 where the court held that C also
had a life estate with a remainder in fee simple in her children.
26. Fetters, supra note 24.
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1947).
28. Professor Fetters points out that no legislation in Arkansas
specifically has abolished Shelley in the fee tail situation and observes
that the Arkansas court offered no explanation as to why our fee tail
statute abolished the rule as applied to estates tail. Fetters, at 281, It
would seem that Hardage v. Stroope, supra note 23, can be justified on
this basis: The statute dealt with cases in which a person could be
seized in fee tail under the common law. Instead of being seized in fee
tail, says the statute, he takes a life estate and the remainder passes to
the heirs tail in fee simple. At common law, one way for A to acquire
an estate tail was by a conveyance to A, remainder to A's bodily heirs.
Shelley's Case vested this estate tail in A. Thus, it would seem that the
Arkansas court is justified in assuming that the statute intends to eliminate this aspect of the Rule in Shelley's Case even though no specific
mention is made of it in the statute.
29. Ark. Acts [1957] No. 163, § 1 (p. 491).
30. See e.g., Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458 (1884).
31. 49 Ark. 125, 4 S.W. 381 (1886).
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But in Bell v. Gentry, 2 the devise was to W, and upon her
decease or remarriage, ". . . to my said children and their bodily
heirs ...
."3
The court held that when W died, the children
took in fee simple. Similarly, in Pletner v. Southern Lumber
Company, 4 G devised to A during her life, remainder to M and
her bodily heirs. It was held that A had a life estate and that
M took in fee simple. Bowlin v. Vinsant35 is representative of
this same construction. Pletner v. Southern Lumber Company,
Bowlin v. Vinsant and that line of cases are contrary to Myar v.
Snow. They are also contrary to the statute. In Henderson
v. Richardson,3 6 the court attempted to distinguish an indistinguishable situation from the Bell-Pletner line by stating that
you can have successive life estates if that intent is clearly manifested by the testator, which apparently leaves the court free to
follow either line of cases which strikes its fancy at a given
moment. Finally, in Lewis v. Bowlin,3 7 the court had before it
a devise to A and unto the heirs of his body, which was the traditional statutory situation. This case involved further litigation under the same set of circumstances which had given rise
to Bowlin v. Vinsant several decades before. Although the
court's decision in the second Bowlin case was in line with
Horsley v. Hilburn and the original Arkansas cases constructing
the statute, the court took the occasion to note an article in the
Arkansas Law Review38 on the subject, as well as this statement
by Professor Powell in his treatise:
Arkansas, by decision, has injected a peculiar distinction between limitations "to B and the heirs of his body" (which are
construed to be governed by the statute) and limitations "to B
for life, remainder to C and the heirs of his body." In the latter
situation, the statute is not applied, and if C is alive at B's death,
C gets an estate in fee simple absolute, but if C is then dead,
C's descendants get the estate in fee simple absolute. This
strange result seems to be based upon the court's unsound belief
that a conveyance to a "remainder" necessarily connotes39the conferring of an estate in fee simple on the remainderman.
The court correctly notes that Powell "criticizes the distinction
made by the court" in this connection and observes that "several learned writers have questioned the soundness of the rule
32.
33.
34.
35.

141
141
173
186

36.

213 Ark. 532, 211 S.W.2d 436 (1948).

Ark. 484, 218 S.W. 194 (1920).
Ark. at 486, 218 S.W. at 194.
Ark. 27, 292 S.W. 370 (1927).
Ark. 740, 55 S.W.2d 927 (1933).

37. 237 Ark. 947, 377 S.W.2d 608 (1964).
38. Comment, The Effect of Stare Decisis Upon Fee Tail in Arkansas, 10 AiK. L. REV. 181 (1956).
39. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 198[2], at 84.2 - 84.3.
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established in the Bell, Pletner and Bowlin cases. ' 40 The court
then defends the error committed in the Bell-Pletner-Bowlin
line with the same defense earlier enunciated in Eubanks v.
to repudiate the rule . . .would result in the
McDonald: "...
invalidation of titles that had been acquired in reliance ... 41
on it.
If the court did not want to overrule this line of cases outright, but wanted to extricate itself from what it apparently recognized quite wisely to be error, it would be a simple matter for
it to issue a caveat to the effect that henceforth the rule would
be different. At the very least, the rule could by a caveat be
42
If it
changed as to estates created after the date of the case.
is to be presumed that landowners in Arkansas fully understand
the fee tail situation as it presently exists (which would be a
remarkable premise in view of the fact that it is barely understood, if at all, by lawyers and law professors), then it may similarly be presumed that they would with reasonable rapidity
apprise themselves of the new rule (which would also be a false
premise, but at least no worse than the previous one).
It may be just as well, however, that the court stuck to its
guns. There are other aspects of the fee tail situation in Arkansas which are in need of correction, and it is almost discriminatory to single out the above milieu as the sole source of confusion. Bradley Lumber Company v. Burbridge,43 for example,
presents a result which is equally irreconciliable with the
statute.
What we have in Arkansas on fee tail is reminiscent of a
line from an old Bob Hope-Hedy Lamarr movie, My Favorite Spy,
in which the villain (observing Hope) comments that a man's
subconscious is "a maudlin swamp." Future interests generally,
and fee tail in particular, are the Okefenokee of Arkansas land
law.
Without considering any further ramifications of the Arkansas fee tail situation, since Professor Fetters explored this juristic entanglement admirably in his earlier article, some brief consideration should be given to the origin of these estates.
The situation which gave rise to estates tail was the essen40.
41.

Lewis v. 'Bowlin, 237 Ark. 947, 951, 377 S.W.2d 608, 610 (1964).
Id. at 951, 377 S.W.2d at 610-611.

42. Arkansas has employed the caveat device in cases not involving
real estate. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601,
249 S.W.2d 973 (1952), and the follow-up case of Universal C.I.T. Corp.
v. Stanley, 225 Ark. 96, 279 S.W.2d 556 (1955).

43.

213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948).
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tially feudal society and the elaborate tenurial system which
prevailed in England in the middle ages. Fee tail conveyances
followed on the heels of D'Arundel's Case44 in 1225. The surrounding principles and aims stemmed from the same tradition
and philosophy as primogeniture. We acquired these principles as a result of Arkansas' reception statute 45 in the same
manner that we acquired so many of these medieval principles,
despite constitutional protestations to the contrary.46 The thinking which produced the fee tail never really had any basis for
application in Arkansas, any more than it did in any other American state, and it is historically ludicrous and rationally absurd for
any state to continue to adhere to such rules in this day and
age. Fee tail should be put to rest once and for all in Arkansas
by appropriate statutory wording abolishing such estates.
As for the Bell v. Gentry situation, the statute should not
only be such that in a case involving a conveyance to A for
life, remainder to A's bodily heirs, A would take a life estate and
his bodily heirs would take in fee simple. It should also be true
that a conveyance to A for life, then to B for life, remainder to
B's bodily heirs, should lead to successive life estates in A and B,
with the bodily heirs to take in fee simple absolute.
47
This discussion has not explored the wilds of Wild's Case
and its ramifications as does Professor Fetters in his article in
the Arkansas Law Review. 48 It is worth suggesting, however,
that a possible effective solution to that situation may be found
in Section 13 of the Uniform Property Act, which provides that
when a conveyance is in favor of a person and his "issue," or
other words of similar import designating the person and his
descendants, the conveyance creates a life estate in the person
unless an intent
and a remainder in fee simple in the descendants,
9
to create other interests is clearly manifested.4
This discussion and the Fetters article would seem to demonstrate also that Shelley's Case, Wild's Case and the fee tail
statute, as well as other considerations, are interlocking in
their ramifications, and changes made in existing law must be
comprehensive alterations which take into consideration the entire panorama of future interests so that the end product is a
comprehensive, functional system. One who sets out to abolish
44. Bracton, N.B. 1054 (1225).
45. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-101 (Repl. 1956).
46.
47.
48.
49.

ARK. CONST. art. II, § 28.
6 Co. Rep. 166, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1599).
Fetters, supra note 24, at 283-292.
UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT § 13.
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fee tail must necessarily concern himself with Wild's Case, Shelley's Case, and related effluvia.
III.

THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE

The basis of the Doctrine of Worthier Title is that a title by
descent is worthier than a title by grant or devise. 50 This only
makes sense in the context of a feudal society. 5' If the title
passed by descent, the lord would be entitled to recover the
payment of relief and might be entitled to the incidents of
wardship and marriage, but if the title passed by devise, the
lord would not receive these feudal incidents. The doctrine actually consists of two rules: (1) If a will gives a freehold estate
to an heir of the testator which is of the same quality and quantity that the devisee would have taken by descent if the testator
had died intestate, then the estate will pass by descent, rather
than by devise; and (2) if the owner grants a life estate to A,
remainder to the heirs of the grantor, the remainder is void and
the grantor is left with a reversion. The first situation, concerning wills, would seem not to be important because normally the devisee-heir is going to take, one way or the other. As
a matter of fact, the Restatement takes the view that this branch
of the rule is no longer a part of American law, 52 even though an
occasional decision still deals with it.5 3 The conclusion that this
branch of the rule is dead and departed has been hopefully
54
expressed with regard to Arkansas.
50.

For an excellent Arkansas-oriented discussion of this subject,

see Comment, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 21 ARK. L. REV. 394
(1967). On the wills branch of the rule, see Morris, The Wills Branch
of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 54 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1956); and on the
inter vivos branch, see Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier
Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 133 (1949).
51. See 3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 375, at 261 (1966); 3 SnIEs &
SMITH, supra note 15, § 1607 (2d ed. 1956).
(1940).

52.

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314, comment J

53.

See Harper & Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L.

REV. 627, 642 (1930); Morris, The Wills Branch of the Worthier Title
Doctrine, 54 MICH. L. REV. 451, 486 (1956).

54. Comment, supra note 50, at 396-404. The author concludes that
West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682 (1855)

rejected the doctrine, although its

pronouncement was considered sufficiently vague that it put "too much
weight on too frail a reed to regard the West case as having irrevocably
expunged the doctrine from the law of Arkansas." Nonetheless, he regards it as "certain that the case does not accept the wills branch as
part of our law." Comment, supra note 50, at 403. He then cites two
leading texts which use West v. Williams as authority for the contention
that the court approved the wills branch: PAGE, WILLS § 214 (3d ed.
1941); THOMPSON, WILLS § 74 (2d ed. 1936). His discussion points up
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Concentrating on the second part of the doctrine, we can
attach some substantial importance to this aspect since if the
grantor has a reversion and has not granted away his entire
estate, he may thwart his heirs by devising it to someone else or
by use of an inter vivos conveyance. The rule may also result
in tax consequences.5 5 Moreover, creditors can levy upon the
reversionary interest.
In a 1954 Virginia case, 56 the court stated that this second
aspect of worthier title has generally been softened into one of
construction, rather than a rule of law which must be applied
in all circumstances. As a rule of construction it could be found
in one of three forms: (a) as a prima facie preference for a reversion; (b) as a prima facie preference for a remainder; or
(c) as presenting an examination into the grantor's intention
without any presumption.
The modern trend seems to be in the direction of that taken
in the Virginia decision, which was based upon Cardozo's earlier
opinion in Doctor v. Hughes,5 7 and in fact several states have
abolished the rule altogether by statute.5 s In a 1959 report,
the California Law Revision Commission recommended that the
doctrine be abolished for the following reasons:
(a) The doctrine is based upon a false premise, namely, the
assumption that a person granting property to his own heirs or
next of kin does not really intend to give the property to them
or understand that he has done so but rather intends to retain
a reversion in the property with full power to dispose of it again
in the future.
(b) The doctrine breeds litigation, since the presumption or
several situations in which (if Arkansas has the wills branch) the doctrine might apply to change the result (had the property instead passed
by devise). One of these, quite obviously, is through the ridiculous
ancestral estate provisions which still obtain in Arkansas. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 61-110 (Supp. 1967).
My own conclusion is that Page and
Thompson must be wrong and our student writer must be correct, if
only for the reason that I can no more envision our court attempting to
breathe life into this old monstrosity than I can accept as fact the result
of Dr. Frankenstein's experiments. But see Cupp v. Frazier's Heirs, 239
Ark. 77, 387 S.W.2d 328 (1965), in which the Arkansas court accepted
the "first purchaser" doctrine as a part of our law even though the
majority of states have long since rejected the concept.
55. The reversion is a taxable part of the estate under Section 2033
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and if it has a value of more than
five per cent of the property transferred, the entire interest will be
included in the taxable estate under Section 2037 of the 1954 Code.
56. Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 81 S.E.2d 560 (1954).
57. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). Cardozo concluded that the
rule persists today only as a rule of construction.
58. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.14(4) (1945); NEB. Rev. Stat.
§§ 76-114, 115 (1943). See also 3 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 15, § 1612.
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rule of interpretation can be defeated by a showing that the
grantor actually meant what he said.
(c) The doctrine can easily operate as an estate and inheritance tax trap by creating a reversionary interest in the estate of
a grantor who intended to avoid such taxes by making an inter
vivos transfer of the property to his heirs or next of kin. 59
Arkansas has been regarded as remaining singularly unaffected by the modern tendency and as construing the inter vivos
branch of the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of law. 60 Although the court does not make such a statement, this is the in61
ference drawn from language contained in Wilson v. Pharris,
a case which seems to incorporate the doctrine into Arkansas law
without explicitly purporting to do so. Whether it did or did
not is a question which is open to debate. The grant in question provided for a reversion to the grantor's heirs upon the
death or marriage of the tenant, which necessarily implies the
retention of the fee subject to the interest of the tenant, as opposed to the situation involved in the case of a vested remainder.
Some of the authority quoted by the court, however, related to
remainders, rather than to reversions, which provides the founda62
tion for the classification of the case by the textwriters.
One recent commentator contends that Wilson v. Pharris
did not establish the inter vivos branch of the doctrine as a rule
of property in Arkansas and, further, that the court was merely
construing the intent of the grantor.6 3 Fletcher v. Ferril 64 is
cited as sustaining the proposition that the rule does not exist
in its common-law form in Arkansas.6 5 It is contended that the
case "conceded that the heirs of a grantor can take as purchas59. Stanton, Law Revision, 34 CAL. B.J. 84, 93 (1959). See also
CRIBBET, FRITz, & JOHNSON, CASES & MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 158 (2d ed.
1966).
60. See 3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 375, at 264; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 4.19, at 441 (1952); 3 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 15, § 1605;
Fetters, Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 ARK. L. REV. 145,
147 (1967).
61. 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d 274 (1941).
62. The Arkansas court's opinion copied a quotation from WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 395 (1887), which had been quoted in an Illinois
case. The quotation from the treatise stated:
At common law, if a man seized of an estate limited it to one
for life, remainder to his own rightful heirs, they would take
not as remaindermen, but as reversioners; and it would be,
moreover, competent for him, as being himself the reversioner,
after making such a limitation, to grant away the reversion.
Quoting this, Fetters, supra note 60, at 147 n.6, observes that Arkansas
thereby adopted "the Doctrine of Worthier Title as a rule of law."
63. Comment, supra note 50, at 409-410 (1967).
64. 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 449 (1950).
65. Comment, supra note 50, at 410.
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ers." 66 The argument is based on this reasoning: The court
stated the principal question to be whether the language of
the deed created a possibility of reverter or an executory limitation, and that the "inquiry" was as to whether the word "heirs"
was one of limitation or purchase; therefore, by implication, the
court admitted the absence of the doctrine of worthier title in
Arkansas because its very consideration of the question is "inconsistent with a rule of property which refuses to admit the
'67
It
possibility that a grantor's heirs can take as purchasers.
is an ingenuous argument, and the inference is further supported by this statement in the opinion:
Even if we should sustain the ... contention that ... the word
"heirs" was used in the deed as a word of purchase, we should
still have to decide the case in the appellant's favor. Under that
construction the deed would vest a determinable fee in the
Lodge, and upon termination of that estate the title would pass
directly to the appellees, not by inheritance from Fletcher but
by virtue of the executory limitation in the deed. 68
Before the conclusion is reached that Arkansas thereby rejected
the doctrine in this case, however, consideration should be given
to what the court actually held. It was conceded that a determinable fee was involved. Construing the conveyance, the
court concluded: (1) that a possibility of reverter may be devised; (2) that the conveyance created a possibility of reverter
as opposed to an executory limitation; (3) that "heirs," as used
in the conveyance was a word of limitation, not of purchase,
and thus the title passed first to the estate of the grantor and
then to the residuary devisee; and (4) that, therefore the title
did not pass by purchase. Consequently, even though the doctrine of worthier title was not employed or even mentioned,
the end result in the case was the same as if it had been applied.
Moreover, as the author of this comment points out, a genuine
rejection of a rule "naturally requires cognizance of the rule
rejected. ' 69 The court seemed oblivious to the rule and seemed
to be dealing with the situation purely in terms of the construction of the deed. Implicitly, once again, this would seem to
suggest that the inter vivos branch of the doctrine does not exist
in Arkansas. But how can any reliance be placed upon such
an implication when the court neither specifically considered or
discussed the doctrine, and in fact reached a conclusion consistent with it? Although it would be hoped when presented
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 586, 227 S.W.2d 449, 450 (1950).
69. Comment, supra note 50, at 411.
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with the question the court would hold that Fletcher v. Ferrill
did in fact amount to a repudiation of the doctrine, the issue
would seem to remain viable at the present time (and the doctrine perhaps just as viable).
Fletcher v. Ferrill serves to render some doubt as to whether
the inter vivos branch of the doctrine is a rule of property in
Arkansas. Offsetting it, however, is the unfortunate quotation
utilized in Wilson v. Pharris. The sum total of the situation is
that, as is quite often the case in the law of future interests in
Arkansas, the situation on the subject of worthier title is confused. Since there is probably sufficient doubt to provide some
leeway to the court should the matter ever be squarely presented, it is not inappropriate to suggest that a major problem
generally in Arkansas property law has been the denomination
of so many of these hoary apparitions as "rules of property" when
in fact many of them are no more than rules of construction
(and generally should not even be glorified to that extent).
Traditionally, courts feel freer to alter rules of construction, and
the Arkansas court of today might feel less constricted if its predecessors had not elevated so many of these ancient constructional preferences into seemingly immutable "rules of property."
The worthier title doctrine (both branches) arose in the late
sixteenth century,70 a fact which makes it of somewhat more
modern vintage than those rules previously discussed. In England, as many have contended is the case in Arkansas, the doctrine operated as a rule of law. The results of its operation
were not favored, however, and it was abolished in England by
statute in 1833.71 The inter vivos branch of the rule nonetheless flourished in America even to the point that a few states
extended it to dispositions of personalty. 72 Although as mentioned earlier the rule has been reduced to one of construction in
some jurisdictions, one authority points out that this often
70. Hinde v. Lyon, 2 Dy. 124a, 73 Eng. Rep. 271 (KB. 1555) (wills
branch); Fennick & Mitford's Case, 1 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 168 (K.B.
1589) (deeds branch). See 3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 381 at 306; Harper

& Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L. REV. 627 (1930);
Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA.
L. REV. 133 (1949); Comment, supra note 50, at 394 (1967).
71. 3 & 4 Wm.IV, Ch. 106, § 3 (1833).
72.

See National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d

113 (1944); Harris v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 533 (1855); Scholtz v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 295 N.Y. 488, 68 N.E.2d 503 (1946); Dunnett
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938); Baltimore v. First & Merchant Nat'l -Bank, 170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938).
See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314(1) (1940).
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leads only to uncertainty in the law and "wasteful expenditures
of money by helpless clients. '73 The proposed Uniform Property
Act abolished the rule and directed that the conveyance operate
in favor of the heirs or next of kin by purchase rather than by
descent.74 Five states have adopted this provision or a similar
provision by statute and have thereby abolished the rule.7 5
Although no substantial amount of litigation in Arkansas
has resulted from the doctrine, it should be abrogated statutorily, and normal rules of construction should be applied with the
heirs taking by purchase in the absence of a manifested intent
to the contrary. This doctrine constitutes simply one more of
those traps for both the public and for busy lawyers, and both
can get along better without it. Probably not a single feudal
lord in Arkansas would miss not having a rule which was developed to assure the benefit of the incidents of relief, ward76
ship, marriage and the like.

IV. DOWER AND DESCENT
Without considering these examples ad infinitum, some
attention might be given to a few more of these rules which we
live by in Arkansas. One which affects a greater number of
people than any of those previously discussed is dower.7 7 By
73. 3

POWELL,

supra note 2, § 381 at 316.

74. UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT § 14.
75. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-114, -115 (1943); NEW YORK ESTATE,
POWERS & TRUSTs LAW § 6-5.9 (McKinney 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.14(4) (1947); WEST'S CAL. CIV. CODE § 1073 (1959); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 30, § 188, 189 (1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-506 (1949); TEX. Civ.
STAT. art. 1291(a) (1963).

76. Wardship and marriage were abolished in England in the midseventeenth century. 12 Car. II,c.24 (1660).
77. Dower is of ancient vintage as are these other appendages of
the past. Blackstone states:
Dower out of the lands seems also to have been unknown in the
early part of our Saxon constitution; for in the laws of King
Edmond, the wife is directed to be supported wholly out of the
personal estate. Afterwards, as may be seen in gavelkind tenure, the widow became entitled to a conditional estate in one
half of the lands; with a proviso that she remained chaste and
unmarried; as is usual also in copyhold dowers, or free bench.
Yet some have ascribed the introduction of dower to the Normans, as a branch of their local tenures; though we cannot expect any feudal reason for its invention, since it was not a part
of the pure, primitive, simple law of feuds, but was first of all
introduced into that system (wherein it was called triens, tertia,
and dotalitium) by the emperor Frederick the Second; who was
contemporary with our King Henry III. It is possible therefore,
that it might be with us the relic of a Danish custom: since,
according to the historians of that country, dower was introduced into Denmark by Swein, the father of our Canute the
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statute, the widow is entitled to one-third of her husband's real
estate for life,78 and one-third of his personalty absolutely 79
if he is survived by children. 80 Estate tax considerations are
important, to be sure, where there is substantial wealth involved.
But the vast majority of people in Arkansas do not have any
estate tax problems. Their marital deduction is not strained
to the breaking point, and the average individual does not even
reach the point of making use of it. In the typical situation of
a young adult, there are almost invariably minor children involved, and often enough his property is not in a tenancy by
the entirety. He may have a bank account and a savings account
and own a heavily mortgaged house, or perhaps a vacant lot or
some farmland, and probably a car or two-and suddenly he
learns that if he dies anytime soon, his minor children are going
to own a two-third's share of his property and that before the
widow can sell anything, a guardianship will have to be created.
Even with older people, there is often the problem of the children
inheriting. This is the type of individual who comes in to have
the proverbial "simple will" prepared leaving it all to the wife.
Whether that is done or his lawyer creates some tenancies by
the entirety or some other approach is adopted, the point is
that the statutes pertaining to dower and descent in Arkansas
today do not correspond to the normal wishes of the vast majority of people, who have some property but not a great deal.
When most people die intestate, things are generally not like
they thought they would be. Contrary to the opinions of
some, probate and intestacy laws are not just for estates of a
quarter-million dollars and up. Intestacy laws, by and large,
should be written for the average man.
One possible solution to this problem is to provide by statute
that the widow would inherit the entire estate upon the death
of the husband intestate. (This might be said to possess the advantage of conforming the law of descent to what some regard as
the usual result in Chancery Court in Arkansas in divorce litigation.) While such a solution might more nearly correspond to
the wishes of the average adult male, it has some apparent
drawbacks. For example, the result would be the same in a
Great, out of gratitude to the Danish ladies ( who sold all their
jewels to ransom him when taken prisoner by the Vandals.
2 Blackstone, COMMENTARIES * 129-130.
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1947).
79.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-202 (1947).
ARK, STAT. ANN. § 61-206 (1947)

80. See

children are involved.

for dower rights where no

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:248

situation involving adult children as in that involving minors,
and the wishes of the decedent in the case of adult offspring
might be that they share in his estate. This is the converse of
the problem under the present statute with regard to adult
offspring in that at present the prospective decedent must disinherit the children. The fundamental question is what the reasonable expectations of most people would be. A compromise
alternative would be to divide the estate between the spouse
and the children so that the surviving spouse takes one-half
and the children share one-half, but this would create a problem where some of the children were minors and some were
adults. Where the children were all adults, such a compromise
might be reasonable. This difficulty might be corrected by an
equal division between the surviving spouse and the children
(with the latter sharing equally in their one-half) and with the
spouse serving as trustee of any minor child's share until that
child reached maturity. If there were no children, the surviving spouse would take it all.
The third working draft of the Uniform Probate Code, 8'
now under discussion by committees of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but not yet adopted
(and therefore subject to change), deals in Article II with the
problem of intestate succession. Although it would not be appropriate at this time to reveal the precise wording of these
particular provisions of this draft, since they may be reworded or
substantially altered, suffice it to say that this Code attempts to
solve the problem in keeping with the changing times. For one
thing, it eliminates the differentiation between men and women
(the old dower-curtesy breakdown of the common law) and
simply refers to the share of the surviving spouse. Its provisions
apply to the survivor without reference to sex, which in this
day and age seems eminently sound. Further, it gives a larger
share to the surviving spouse-the entire net intestate estate, if
there is no issue (possibly with some limitation attached if the
surviving spouse and decedent were married for a short length
of time). In the event of surviving issue, the surviving spouse
would take an initial lump sum amount plus one-half of the
balance, unless the surviving issue are not also issue of the
surviving spouse, in which case the living spouse takes one-half.
A separate, although similar, provision would be provided for
community property states. Other provisions are devoted to the
share of heirs other than the surviving spouse. As stated, these
81. Printed in November, 1967.
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provisions have not been finally approved by the Commissioners and do not, as of now, reflect the final view. Be that as
it may, it would seem that these provisions are pointing in the
proper direction. Once the Uniform Probate Code is finally
promulgated, Arkansas should give careful attention to it and
should consider adoption of it or incorporation of some of its
better provisions into our existing Code. While no particular
solution is suggested at this time, it is urged that Arkansas'
statutory provisions as they presently stand seldom serve either
the wishes of the decedent, his best interests or the best interests
of his survivors.
There would seem to be an increasing agreement, as indicated from the preliminary work on the Uniform Probate Code,
that one-third is too small an amount in an intestate situation for
the share of the surviving spouse. It should be no less than onehalf, absolutely, under all circumstances, and with regard to both
real and personal property. In that connection also, the proposed
Uniform Code, as now written, eliminates the distinction for inheritance purposes between real and personal property as being
no longer meaningful, and such a conclusion seems well justified.
It would further seem that proposed revision in Arkansas should
attempt to meet the problem posed by minor children in such a
way as to avoid guardianship expenses. The dower-curtesy bifurcation should be abandoned, as in the proposed Uniform Code,
and the statute should simply refer to the surviving spouse.
There is no justification for treating the husband and wife differently in this regard under the circumstances of modern
America, and there will be even less reason for such a differentiation as the years go by.
It is also obvious, as the Commissioners have recognized in
going beyond a consideration of dower in the Code, that dower
provides only an introduction to the problem and that what is
needed is a reconsideration and revision of our entire statutory
law of descent. Aside from the obvious necessity of erasing a
number of ambiguities and conflicts, there is again the need of
meeting the reasonable desires and expectations of the majority
of our people, keeping in mind that the law of descent is a statutory testament for all who fail to write their own. What we
have at present is probably not too far, in many respects, from
the ideal situation. 82 A decedent who had neither spouse nor
children might reasonably and most often prefer that his prop82.

See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-101 (1947).
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erty pass first to his parents, then to his brothers and sisters if
there were no parents. He would likely choose, in most instances, his brothers and sisters over his grandparents, and almost certainly his grandparents over his aunts and uncles;8 3 and
after that it would not make much if any difference one way or
the other.
As for "ancestral" estates, 4 this perversion is a clear throwback, at best, to a time when our laws were geared to a plantation society and, at worst, to the feudal period itself. This
anomaly should be abandoned.
V.

THE DESTRUCTIBILITY OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS

Most American jurisdictions have done away with the doc85
trine of the destructibility of contingent remainders by statute,
but Arkansas is not among them. About half of the states are
without any statutory provision on the subject,86 although some
of those have held the rule to be nonexistent there through
judicial decision.8 7 The destructibility doctrine apparently exists in Florida, 8 Oregon8 9 and Pennsylvania 0 and has been said
to exist in Tennessee. 91 There is dictum which indicates its possible existence in South Carolina, 92 North Carolina 93 and Ar83. In this respect, the author differs with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61101 (1947), which places the grandparents, uncles and aunts on equal
footing.
84. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-110 (Supp. 1967). Strangely enough,
the General Assembly amended this statute in 1967, and left ancestral
estates intact. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-111 (1947) is cut from the same
cloth as ancestral estates, although the latter are exempted from its
provisions. Ancestral estates today simply clutter up and complicate
land law in Arkansas without possessing any real, underlying rationale
for their existence. They are akin to primogeniture, feudal tenures and
a landed aristocracy. They have no place in any modern law of descent.
The only other states in the United States which still recognize
ancestral estates are Delaware and Tennessee. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 501 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1955).
85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 49, 137 (1958); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 76-116, 117 (1956); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-116 (1966).
86. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 314, at 675.
87. Godfrey v. Rowland, 16 Hawaii 377 (1905); Rouse v. Paidrick,
221 Ind. 517, 49 N.E.2d 528 (1943); Williams v. Bricker, 83 Kan. 53, 109
Pac. 998 (1910); Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N.H. 498 (1860).
88. Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
89. Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Ore. 66, 147 Pac. 935 (1915).
90. Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309, 20 Atl. 1002 (1891).
91. Manhattan Saving Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187,
30 S.W.2d 227 (1930).
92. Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915).
93. Winslow v. Speight, 187 N.C. 248, 121 S.E. 529 (1924).
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kansas. 94 These conclusions, however, are to a substantial degree
a subject of dispute. In a 1958 leading article in the Minnesota
Law Review, Professor Dukeminier of Kentucky (now of
U.C.L.A.) recognized that some old cases in Oregon, North Carolina and Pennsylvania apply the doctrine, but felt that "its
present vitality is very doubtful" in those states.9 5 Moreover,
he viewed Tennessee and Arkansas as having "clearly rejected
destructibility."9 6
The case customarily cited in Arkansas for the proposition
that the rule is followed here is LeSieur v. Spikes,97 a 1915 case
which Professor Powell construed in his treatise on real property as demonstrating that the destructibility doctrine may be
found in Arkansas.9 8 Professor Dukeminier, however, viewed
this case as abolishing destructibility by merger in this state. 99
In a recent article in the Arkansas Law Review, Professor Fetters
found the court's analysis in the LeSieur case to be confused,
pointing out that the court erred in classifying the grantor's interest as a possibility of reverter rather than a reversion, which
the court acknowledged as an error in a later case. 100 Contrary
to Dukeminier's conclusion that LeSieur abolished the doctrine
of destructibility by merger, however, Fetters concludes that the
94. LeSieur v. Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W. 413 (1915) is the case

usually cited for this proposition. A more likely candidate is Sewell v.
Thrailkill, 209 Ark. 393, 194 S.W.2d 202 (1945), which is considered in
Fetters, supra note 60, at 155-157.

95. Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests:
A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13, 37 (1958).
96. Id. at 39.

97. Supra note 94.

98. See 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 314, at 676. Powell recognizes
that the rule was not applied in this case. In addition to Powell, other
textwriters stating that the destructibility rule may be in effect in
Arkansas, based on dictum, are 1 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 15, § 197
and SCHWARTZ, FuTuRE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 32 (1965).

99. Dukeminier, supra note 95, at 36.
100. Fetters, supra note 60, at 154-155. The later case was Davis v.
Prior to the Davis case, on
Davis, 219 Ark. 623, 243 S.W. 739 (1951).
rehearing in Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 591, 227 S.W.2d 449, 453
(1950), the court had to distinguish the LeSieur case on the basis that
in Fletcher it had held that a possibility of reverter may be devised,
whereas in LeSieur a will was not involved. Moreover, "the statement
was merely dictum" in LeSieur because "Dixie LeSieur in fact was survived by heirs of her body and therefore it was unnecessary to decide
whether a possibility of reverter can be transferred by deed." This
statement partially ignores and partially compounds the error in LeSieur. It might be contended that it impliedly supports Dukeminier's
thesis that destructibility by merger does not exist in Arkansas; but the
problem with that conclusion is that the court gives no indication of
recognizing the import of the situation.

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:248

erroneous classification of the grantor's interest as a nondisposable possibility of reverter probably led to the result because
there could not be a merger if no "disposable interest" remained
in the grantor.' 0 ' The language of the court supports this thesis:
"The entire estate except the possibility of reverter, not a disposable interest, passed. . by the [original] conveyance ...and
said grantor could not thereafter by conveyance defeat the rights
of the remaindermen in the lands, and this without regard to
whether the fee be considered in abeyance, during the estate of
the life tenant, or still held by the original grantor for the purpose only of passing to the remaindermen upon the termination
of the life estate.' 10 2 Clearly, this case cannot be relied upon
as having abolished the doctrine of destructibility by merger
where the court was operating under the idea (misconception
though it was) that no interest remained in the grantor which
could be conveyed. Merger cannot merge something with nothing.
As the Fetters article suggests, the court's mention of
whether the fee was "in abeyance" or in the grantor for the
sole purpose of passing it on to the remaindermen was simply an
added indicia of its confusion. Reversions are not held "in abeyance" and the absence of a determinable fee created a decided
problem for the court in thinking in terms of a possibility of reverter. 10 3 Nonetheless, even in the midst of this emasculation,
it seems reasonable to conclude that the court never reached
the point of considering the problem of merger because the
"entire estate" had "passed" in the original conveyance. If, then,
it may be said that Arkansas did not abolish the principle of
destructibility of contingent remainders by merger in this case,
may it be said (with Powell) that this case illustrates the viability of the doctrine in Arkansas? Such a conclusion could stem
from this case only by implication, and although it is arguable
that the language of the court, as quoted above, means that if
the grantor held a "disposable interest" he could defeat the remaindermen by a conveyance, the case is not sufficiently clear
to arrive definitely at such a conclusion. The court confused the
law and the facts to the point that the case is of little value as
demonstrating very much of anything, and the fact that Powell
and Dukeminier arrived at contrary conclusions appropriately
101. Fetters, supra note 60, at 154.
102. 117 Ark. at 371, 175 S.W. at 414.
103. Fetters, supra note 60, at 155.
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demonstrates that little reliance can be placed on LeSieur v.
Spikes.
The LeSieur case involved a conveyance to A and the heirs of
her body, with the property to "revert" to the grantor if A
should die without any surviving bodily heirs. A and the grantor
conveyed to a third party, and later A died leaving two children.
Under the Arkansas fee tail provisions, discussed previously, A
had a life estate and the surviving children took in fee simple.
If the grantor had a reversion in fee simple, and her interest
came together with that of the life tenant, A, the result would
be a merger of A's life estate which in turn causes the remainder
to fail under the destructibilty rule. This is why the classification of the grantor's interest was crucial. Other situations in
which the destructibility rule has application are, for example,
in a conveyance to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B (with A
predeceasing B); or in a conveyance to A for life, then if B
reaches age twenty-one, to B and his heirs (with A dying prior to
the contingency). 104 In the former situation, the heirs of B would
run afoul of the rule that no man can be an heir of the living; 00
and in both situations, there is the problem that the supporting
freehold estate has been wiped out. The remainder has to vest
at or before the termination of the prior estate or it is void
10 6
under the destructibility rule.
The lack of rational applicability of the destructibility doctrine to modern property transactions should be apparent. It
is based on the concept from the feudal period that seisin
could not be held in abeyance, and thus if the supporting
freehold estate failed, the contingent remainder must also fail
in order that someone could instantaneously be seized of the
land. The reason, as in so many of these old rules, is once
again tied to the privileges accorded the feudal lords. Someone had to be immediately available from whom the feudal
dues and services could be extracted.'0 7
Society and to a
large extent the state itself were structured upon the feudal system and the services and obligations which stemmed from
it. Centuries have passed, however, since the reason departed
from the rule. Thus, when the life tenant dies before the con104. See 1
1952).
105.
106.

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 4.60, at 510 (Casner ed.

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 327, at 46 (1939).
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *171; JACOBSON, ARKANSAS CHANCERY PRACTICE 524 (1940).
107. KALES, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 10, at 10 (2d ed. 1920).

2
2

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:248

tingent interest can vest (as before B reaches twenty-one in the
example given above), there is no longer any reason why the title
should not be viewed in the same light as an executory interest
or simply as resting in the grantor in trust until such time as the
remainder can vest. 0 8 This vitiates the rule of Purefoy v.
Rogers,1 9 and emasculates the historic medieval mish-mash
which long before that case had pointed the way toward and
necessitated the creation of uses. 110 But the primary concern
should be the fulfillment of the intent of the grantor to the
extent that it can be fulfilled in keeping with the interests of
society generally.
Before leaving destructibility, some attention might be given
to some more recent Arkansas cases which Professor Dukeminier
argues held contingent remainders indestructible."' One was
Lathrop v. Sandlin,12 in which the conveyance was to A for
life, then to the bodily heirs of the grantor. By a subsequent
deed, the grantor conveyed the fee simple title to A (his wife).
The Arkansas court held that bodily heirs of the grantor had
an interest under the earlier deed that was not extinguished by
the later deed. On its face, this case would certainly seem to
support the Dukeminier evaluation of it. Yet, in the Fetters
article, it is pointed out that the case "bears no evidence" that
the destructibility by merger doctrine was in issue, and "it would
be a thin thesis indeed which would claim that a given result
must be predicated upon the repudiation of a rule which is neither raised as a litigation issue nor appreciated and considered
by those who have engaged in the decisional process. 1" 3 Similarly, Dukeminier urges Hutchison v. Sheppard"4 as a case in
which "the life tenant inherited the reversion and subsequently
attempted to convey a fee, but again the court held this would
108. See 2 POWELL,
109.

REAL PROPERTY

§ 314, at 678 (1967).

2 Win. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670).

In this case, it

was stated that a contingency "limited to depend on an estate of freehold . .. capable of supporting a'remainder . . . shall never be construed to be an executory devise, but a contingent remainder only. .. ."
85 Eng. Rep. at 1192. This was over a century after the Statute of Uses,
27 Hen. VIII, c. 19 (1535), which permitted executory interests to vest
in futuro, and which type of future interest was upheld as indestructible
in Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
110. See the interesting discussion in BERGIN & HASKELL, PREFACE TO
ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 84-115 (1966).

111.
112.
113.
114.

Dukeminier, supra note 95, at 36.
223 Ark. 774, 268 S.W.2d 606 (1954).
Fetters, supra note 60, at 158.
225 Ark. 14, 279 S.W.2d 33 (1955).
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not destroy contingent remainders."u 5 Fetters, however, points
to the court's statement that the reversion was overlooked by
the parties and not called to the chancellor's attention; and thus,
there was no basis on appeal to invalidate the contingent remainder."1 6 Other cases cited by Dukeminier to sustain his proposition ' 7 are viewed by Fetters as demonstrating not a refusal to apply the destructibility rule but rather a clear indication "that Arkansas attorneys do not . .. recognize that combination of juristic facts which might give rise to its application.""18 If this is correct, then the destructibility rule poses a
somewhat indistinct, although clearly possible, threat to Arkansas attorneys, since someone is sure to come along eventually
who will be able to recognize the problem and raise the issue.
When that time comes, Sewell v. Thrailkill,1 9 a 1945 case which
is discussed at length by Professor Fetters,' 20 offers some hope
of success to the party urging destructibility, since in that case
the court went to great lengths to determine whether the
remainder was vested or contingent when such a determination
would only have mattered if Arkansas follows the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders by merger. The court determined that the remainder was vested, but as to the effect of
it had it been contingent, "that question is reserved."''
It is
interesting to note that the court erred in the Sewell case in
declaring the remainder to be vested when it was actually
contingent; otherwise, it would have been faced with the question which it reserved.
Another older case which contributes to the argument that
Arkansas recognizes destructibility is Shirey v. Clark, 22 in which
this statement was made:
It is contended that the conveyance by A. W. *Clark to Emily
Clark, his wife, created a contingent remainder, which was defeated, and that the estate reverted to the grantor, the precedent
estate having been expired by the wife's death before his; and
the counsel for the appellant says "that a deed to the heirs of a
115. Dukeminier, supra note 95, at 36.
116. Fetters, supra note 60, at 157.
117. Walker v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W.2d 979 (1956); Robertson v. Sloan, 222 Ark. 671, 262 S.W.2d 148 (1953); Peebles v. Garland,

221 Ark. 185, 252 S.W.2d 396 (1952); Weatherly v. Purcell, 217 Ark. 908,
234 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165,
210 S.W.2d 284 (1948).
118. Fetters, supra note 60, at 157.
119.
120.

209 Ark. 393, 194 S.W.2d 202 (1945).
Fetters, supra note 60, at 155-157.

121.
122.

209 Ark. at 397, 194 S.W.2d at 203.
72 Ark. 539, 81 S.W. 1057 (1904).
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living person is always held void unless it is clear from the context that children are meant, which could not be where there is,
the
as here, no context." We may admit that his statement of 123
law is correct; and yet his assumption of fact . . . is wrong.

In this case the conveyance was from Clark to his wife, Emily,
for life, and after her death "then to the heirs of the said A. W.
Clark by the said Emily Clark," which was interpreted to mean
the children in esse of A. W. Clark by Emily. Presumably, except for that interpretation, the destructibility rule would have
been applied. Yet the court did not apply it, and we are left
only with the implication that it otherwise would have.
It is hardly satisfactory to speculate on the subject. The
Arkansas court has shown such a distinct reticence to overturn
"rules of property" which might "result in the invalidation of
titles that had been acquired in reliance" upon them12 4 that the
court might very well discover or rediscover destructibility of
contingent remainders as one of these ancient, hallowed common law rules and apply it to eliminate a contingent interest.
If it did so, of course, under the supposition that titles had vested
in reliance on it, it would be ignoring the fact that few Arkansas
lawyers apparently recognize the doctrine even when confronted
with it in a lawsuit, as the cases illustrate. Titles could hardly
vest in reliance on a doctrine of which not even the great majority of the Bar is seemingly aware. But as long as the possibility
remains that the destructibility rule may be in effect in Arkansas, the creation of future interests which could give rise to its
application will provide a source of potential litigation.
VI.

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Turning very briefly to the rule against perpetuities, we find
something which Professor Leach of Harvard has described as a
"technicality-ridden legal nightmare" which is a "dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of the Bar."'1 25 Professors Bergin and Haskell have observed that the rule "had its
origin in the musty atmosphere of seventeenth century land
law."'1 26 The rule, stated rather briefly, provides that an interest must vest if at all not later than "twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest.' ' 2 7 That is
123. 72 Ark. at 542-543, 81 S.W. at 1058.
124. Lewis v. Bowlin, 237 Ark. 947, 377 S.W.2d 608 (1964). See also,
Eubanks v. McDonald, 225 Ark. 470, 283 S.W.2d 166 (1955).
125. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1349 (1954).
126. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 110, at 184.
127. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. -1942).
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an oversimplification, of course, as far as its ramifications and
applications are concerned. 128 It is supposedly intended to promote the free alienation of land.12' 9 What it mostly does is
entrap lawyers and laymen. Certainly, the bulk of Arkansas
lawyers tend to avoid drafting anything which might even remotely hint at violation of the rule. This rule and the jungle of
case interpretations in which it finds solace probably inhibits the
creation of future interests more than any other rule extant.
Leach says that the rule simply serves to defeat "reasonable
dispositions of reasonable property owners" and should be "substantially changed by statute," and that "lawyers ought to see
that this is done. 1 80 One possibility for correction of this situation which Leach suggested 131 and which he stated was later
suggested also by Professor Simes of Michigan, is the use of the
cy pres doctrine. 3 2 This would change the penalty for violating
the rule from the invalidation of the entire interest to permitting the court to reform the gift in such a way that the testator's
wishes are carried out to the greatest extent permissible. In
effect, something of a court-created trust results. Leach doubted
that such a statute could be passed, but said that if Michigan
could pass it, "the Sacred Codfish of Massachusetts will make a
deep bow in the direction of the Wolverine." 183 The Massachusetts statute has a provision which, where there is an age contingency in an instrument which exceeds twenty-one years,
simply reduces it by operation of law to twenty-one years.3tIt also provides that where an interest is dependent on a contingency which may. occur beyond the period of perpetuities,
the present estate becomes a fee simple absolute if the contingency fails to occur within thirty years. 135
These possibilities are pointing toward the necessary solution. The rule is too harsh as it stands and serves chiefly to
harm the innocent. There is no need to suffer under it when a
solution is available to mitigate the ill effects while at the same
time not unduly restricting the alienation of land.
128. See 3 Snwis & SMirH, supra note 15, at 107.
129. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 762, at 552 (1967).
130. Leach, supra note 125.
131. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721, 746 (1952).

132.
133.
134.
135.

See Leach, supra note 125, at 1353-1354.
Id. at 1354.
MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 184A, § 2 (1955).
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 184A, § 3 (Supp. 1965).
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CONCLUSION

This discussion has admittedly rambled from rule to rule
and has only hit the high spots of but a few problem areas. 186
The aim of this abbreviated examination, however, has not been
to instruct, but to point up the unreason which marks many of
the present rules regulating the transfer of interests in property in Arkansas. 18 7 The problem all too often is that courts,
lawyers and property professors have honored these ancient
strictures too much and too long. An air of mysticism and unquestioning acceptance has grown up about them, so that they
have become somewhat like religious relics. The law of real
property is in many respects more historical than logical, 18 but
it ought not to be. It should be a useful adjunct to a growing,
dynamic economy, an effective tool of landowners and businessmen which may be employed in such a way as to meet their
needs and expectations. What is needed in Arkansas is a thorough and complete overhaul of our existing law, preceded by a
careful study of the ramifications of proposed changes, keeping
in mind that property law is interrelated and has to be considered as a whole. 139 Such a project might take several years, but
the end result would surely prove beneficial.
Our legal tradition has always been a tradition of change as
the law has developed to meet new conditions and to solve new
problems. 1 40 We are long overdue, however, in adapting the law
136. How can such a multiplicity of problems be covered even in
an "overview" without writing an extended treatise on the subject?
With regard to descent alone, Harry Meek observes that our milieu has
"obfuscated Arkansas lawyers for more than one hundred years." Meek,
Descent and Distribution, ARRANSAs

DESK MANUAL

17 (1961).

Almost

ninety years ago, the Arkansas court opined "our confused and incongruous law of descents and distributions." Oliver v. Vance, 34 Ark. 564,
567 (1879). In more recent years, the court has referred to "unjust"
rules which were "logical only in the days of feudalism," Jaber v. Miller,
219 Ark. 59, 65, 235 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1951), but has also declined to repudiate error because such action "would result in the invalidity of titles
that had been acquired in reliance" on the rule being considered. Lewis
v. Bowlin, 237 Ark. 947, 951, 377 S.W.2d 608, 610-611 (1964).
137. For more of the same, see a student note in this same issue on
the effect of divorce on tenancies by the entirety.
138. One of Judge E. B. Meriwether's favorite observations during
his years as Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas. See
Holmes, J., in Gardinerv. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 (1918): [Property
law] "is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."
139. See Fetters, supra note 24, at 275.
140. Roscoe Pound observed that law has for us been in large measure an institution to legitimate the acceptable and reasonable claims and
demands placed upon it. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
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of property to the modern world of commerce by appropriate
statutory provisions. To make such changes as these, to build a
better structure upon the yet valid and historic rocks which
form the foundation of our law of property, is in the highest
41
and best sense an integral part of the common law tradition.1

Professor Willard Hurst has seen in our legal processes an adaptation to the
"resistless change of circumstances" in our use of law "to free the Present of the encumbering Past." HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 235 (1960).
Indeed: "Law's conservatism, in
the real and best sense of the word, has been manifested in its ability
to accomplish the purpose of assimilating change into the broader fabric
of our life and institutions without disturbing the basic framework or
upsetting the momentum." WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 277 (1968).
141. One great legal scholar, Karl Llewellyn, once penned these
verses about the common law:
Come gather and sing to the Common Law
Whose leaf and seed we are,
Whether we live by the waggling jaw
Or counsel, miles from the Bar.
The wood is good and the sap is strong
OF LAW 99 (1922); POUND, THE TASK OF THE LAW 88-89 (1944).

That gave us Coke and Hale,

Right is a battle to win from Wrong,
In spite of contempt and jail.
It calls for brain and it calls for will,
But an acorn knows its mission:
Law is the Oak of Liberty still,
In the Common Law Tradition.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 399 (1960).

